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The following parties to this proceeding are also parties in this appeal: 
1. Chris Ann Mellor Williams, in her capacity as birth parent and 
guardian for Hayden Williams (deceased); and 
2. Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation. 
The following party to this proceeding is not a party in this appeal: 
3. Wasatch Crest Insurance Company. 
The following are parties to this proceeding solely by virtue of the 
administrative consolidation of two liquidation proceedings, but they have no 
interest in this appeal: 
4. Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company; and 
5. Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company in Liquidation. 
The following is not a party to this appeal, but was part of the proceedings that 
resulted in the first decision by this Court in this case, Mellor v. Wasatch Crest 
Mut Ins. Co., 2009 UT5, \ 20, 201 P.3d 1004: 
6. The Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 4 
C. Statement of Facts 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 14 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ERROR 14 
II. THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ORDER 
ON APPEAL IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT 15 
A. Under Bedrock Law, the November 1, 2010 Order Is Not a 
Final Judgment 15 
B. Mellor's Finality Arguments Lack Merit 18 
III. MELLOR MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE LIQUIDATOR'S DENIAL OF HER 
CLAIM BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE THE REQUIRED OBJECTION TO 
THE SECOND AMENDED NOD 21 
IV. MELLOR'S CLAIM Is NOT A CLASS THREE CLAIM 26 
A. The Claim Is Not a Claim Under a Wasatch Crest Policy 
Under Section 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(ii) 30 
ii 
B. The Claim Is Not a Governmental Claim Under Section 31A-
27-335(2)(c)(i)(A) 32 
C. Because Medicaid Fully Indemnified Mellor's Loss, Section 
31 A-27-335(2)(c)(ii) Excludes the Claim From Class Three 36 
1. The Statute Prohibits Mellor' s Equitable Arguments 
2. The Fact of Medicaid Payments Cannot Override 
Unambiguous Statutory Provisions 38 
J . U l'AH CODE ANN. § 26-19-5 and § 26-19-7 (2005) Are 
Inapplicable 39 
4. Exclusion of Mellor from Class Three Does Not Result 
in an Impermissible Windfall 42 
i). Mellor's Claim Is, at Best, a Class Six Claim 43 
CONCLUSION 44 
ni 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
CASES 
Anderson v. WilshireInvestments, L.L.C., 
2005 UT 59, 123 P.3d 393 15 
Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002UT58,52P.3dll58 24 
Beehive Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of Utah, 
2004 UT 18, 89 P.3d 131 14 
Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 
2007 UT 87, 171 P.3d 442 24 
Billings v. Toscano, 
2010 UT App 389, 2010 WL 5550456 5 
Bradbury v. Valencia, 
2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649 15, 16 
Cade v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 
956P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1998) 16 
Comm. Sec. Bank v. Phillips, 
655 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982) 24 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery Cty., 
702 P.2d 121 (Utah 1985) 17 
Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977) 17 
Hill v. Estate ofAllred, 
2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929 15 
In re General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 
2004 UT 106, 110 P.3d 666 21-22 
IV 
Loffredo v. Holt, 
2001 UT 97, 37 P.3d 1070 16 
Lucero v. Kennard, 
2004 UT App 94, 89 P.3d 175, 
aff'd, 2005 UT 79,125 P.3d 917 25 
MacKay v. Hardy, 
973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 14 
Mellor v. Wasatch CrestMut. Ins. Co., 
2009 UT 5, 201 P.3d 1004 passim 
Powell v. Cannon, 
2008 UT 19, 179 P.3d 799 16 
Salt Lake Cty. Comm 'n v. Salt Lake Cty. Atty., 
1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899 17 
Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 
2010 UT 45, 234 P.3d 1105 39 
State ex rel. Clark v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of West Virginia, Inc., 
195 W.Va. 537, 466 S.E.2d 388 (1995) 38 
State v. Robison, 
2006UT65, 147P.3d448 24 
State v. Wallace, 
2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540 35, 38 
Switzerland Cheese Ass 'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 
385 U.S. 23 (1966) 17 
Webster v. Jones, 
587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978) 24-25 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2010) 36-37 
UTAH INSURER RECEIVERSHIP ACT, UTAH CODE ANN. § § 31 A-27a-101 — 
31A-27a-902(2007) 2 
v 
UTAH INSURERS REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION ACT, UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 31A-27-101 - 31A-27-342 (2002, repealed 2007) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-5(l)(b) (2005) 40 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(a)(i) (2005) 41 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(b) (2005) 41 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(c) (2005) 41 
UTAH CODE ANN. §26-19-7(2)(c)(ii)(2005) 41 
UTAH CODE ANN. §26-19-7(4)(a)(2005) 42 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(4)(b) (2005) 42 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(4)(c) (2005) 42 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-307(l) (1999, repealed 2007) 26 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-307(3) (1999, repealed 2007) 26 
UTAHCODEANN.§31A-27-3 17 (2002, repealed 2007) 5 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-328(l) (1999, repealed 2007) 32-33 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-329 (1985, repealed 2007) 32-33 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-332(l) (2002, repealed 2007) 12,21 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-332(l)(b)(l) (2002, repealed 2007) 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-332(l)(b)(2) (2002, repealed 2007) 23 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335 (2000, repealed 2007) 26 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-335(l)(a) (2000, repealed 2007) 26 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(l)(d) (2000, repealed 2007) 37,38 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(a) (2000, repealed 2007) 26 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(b) (2000, repealed 2007) 26 
vi 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(i) (2000, repealed 2007) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(ii) (2000, repealed 2007) 30,32 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) (2000, repealed 2007) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(d) (2000, repealed 2007) 27 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(e) (2000, repealed 2007) 27 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(2)(f)(i) (2000, repealed 2007) 27,44 
UTAH CODE ANN. §31A-27a-119(2007) 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. §31A-28-102(2001) 20 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-28-114(3)(a) (2001) 20 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2002) 1 
UTAHR. APP. P. 4(a) 1 
UTAH R.APP. P. 24(a)(5) 14 
UTAHR. APP. P. 24(k) 14,30 
WEST VA. CODE § 33-24-27 38 
vii 
Lennard W. Stillman (the Liquidator), in his capacity as the court-appointed 
Special Deputy Liquidator of Respondent and Appellee Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company in Liquidation (the Liquidation Estate or WCICIL), respectfully submits 
this brief in response to the Opening Brief of Appellant Chris Aim Mellor (Mellor). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Mellor asserts this Court's jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) (2002) and UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). Opening Brief (OB) at 4. She ignores 
the jurisdictional issues raised in the Liquidation Estate's Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal and supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed on January 
21,2011. 
By Order entered on March 30, 2011, the Court deferred ailing on the 
motion for summary dismissal until plenary presentation on the merits. The Court 
further ruled that, as to the arguments concerning jurisdiction, "the parties may 
choose to rest on the pleadings they have submitted or may address the matter as 
they see fit in briefing and/or at argument." The Liquidation Estate relies on the 
arguments stated in its Motion to Dismiss Appeal and below. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to decide Mellor's appeal because 
the November 1, 2010 district court order denying Mellor's summary judgment 
motion and reaffirming the stay entered in the Liquidation Order is not a final and 
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appealable judgment and there is no basis for Mellor to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal? 
2. Assuming jurisdiction, arguendo, is Mellor's present attempt to 
challenge the Liquidator's June 29, 2010 denial of her claim barred because she 
failed to file an objection to that determination within sixty days, as required by 
Section 31 A-27-332(l)(b)(i) of the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§31A-27-101 - 31A-27-342 (2002, repealed 2007) (the 
Liquidation Act)?1 
3. Assuming jurisdiction and ignoring Mellor's failure to timely object 
to the June 29, 2010 denial of her claim, did the Liquidator correctly conclude that 
Mellor was fully indemnified by Medicaid and is therefore excluded from Class 
Three under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) (2000, repealed 2007)? 
In 2007 the legislature repealed the Liquidation Act and enacted the Insurer 
Receivership Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§31 A-27a-101 - 31 A-27a-902 (2007). The 
newer Receivership Act is not applicable to "a delinquency proceeding ongoing on 
April 30, 2007." Id at § 31 A-27a-l 19. Therefore, the older Liquidation Act 
applies to this proceeding, which was pending as of April 30, 2007. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises out of the liquidation of Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company (Wasatch Crest) under the Liquidation Act. On June 29, 2010, the 
Liquidator issued a notice of determination denying Mellor's claim against the 
estate in liquidation. Mellor did not file any objection to that determination in the 
district court. Instead, Mellor appealed to this Court from a district court order that 
denied a summary judgment motion Mellor had filed before the Liquidator's 
determination of her claim. 
The Liquidation Act sets forth precise and mandatory procedures for claims 
against the liquidation estate. The Act does not permit a claimant like Mellor to 
pursue a claim through a "summary judgment" motion, and it requires a claimant 
to file a timely objection to the liquidator's claim determination. The statute is 
unambiguous regarding the effect of a failure to file a timely objection - the 
Liquidator's determination becomes final. In addition, Utah law limits this Court's 
jurisdiction to final orders. Finally, the Liquidation Act is clear that claims subject 
to indemnification from other sources are excluded from Class Three payment 
priority. Because Medicaid has already fully paid for the medical services covered 
by Mellor's claim - and Mellor neither paid nor owes money for those services -
3 
the Liquidator correctly determined that Mellor does not have a Class Three claim 
for losses incurred under a Wasatch Crest policy. 
In this appeal, Mellor asks the Court to ignore its lack of jurisdiction, her 
failure to comply with the Liquidation Act's mandatory procedural requirements, 
and the Act's unambiguous classification provisions. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Mellor's Fourth District Lawsuit. In March 2003, about five months 
before the Utah Insurance Commissioner placed Wasatch Crest into liquidation, 
Mellor filed suit against Wasatch Crest and other defendants in Mellor v. Wasatch 
Crest Mutual Insurance Co., Civil No. 030401281 (4th Jud. Dist.) (the Fourth 
<-y 
District Lawsuit). R. 3614-3684. In the Fourth District Lawsuit, Mellor asserted 
tort and contract claims against Wasatch Crest based on Wasatch Crest's 
termination of coverage and failure to pay for medical services provided to her 
minor son, Hay den Williams, after a near-drowning accident on August 4, 2001. 
Id. 
sy 
Among the additional defendants in the Fourth District Lawsuit was Wasatch 
Crest Mutual Insurance Company (Mutual), which is a separate entity that never 
provided coverage to Mellor. Mutual was separately placed into liquidation on 
July 31, 2003, in Civil No. 030915528 (3d Jud. Dist, Timothy R. Hanson, J.), R. 
1-12, and an Amended Order of Liquidation with a Finding of Insolvency was 
entered on August 11, 2003. R. 100-01. On July 31, 2003, the separate liquidation 
proceedings against Wasatch Crest and Mutual were consolidated for 
administrative purposes only. R. 82-83. 
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The liquidation proceeding. On July 11, 2003, the Utah Insurance 
Commissioner filed a petition to place Wasatch Crest into liquidation (Liquidation 
Petition). See R. 143-144. On July 31, 2003, Wasatch Crest was placed into 
liquidation as WCICIL, in Civil No. 030915528 (3d Jud. Dist, Timothy R. 
Hanson, J.) (the Liquidation Order). R. 143-154. The Liquidation Order stayed all 
pending proceedings against Wasatch Crest under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-317 
(2002, repealed 2007). The Order also directed all pending and prospective claims 
against Wasatch Crest to be presented as claims against the Liquidation Estate, as 
required by the Liquidation Act. R. 153, f 18. On August 11, 2003, an Amended 
Order of Liquidation was entered with a Finding of Insolvency. R. 155-156. 
On November 5,2003, Mellor filed a Proof of Claim against the Liquidation 
Estate for payment of the policy benefits she had sought against Wasatch Crest in 
the Fourth District Lawsuit. R. 5583-5584. The Fourth District Lawsuit remained 
stayed until February 5, 2007, when it was dismissed without prejudice based on 
Mellor's counsel's statement that "the liquidation action of Wasatch Crest must be 
addressed in the Third District, where the liquidation was filed." Docket Sheet, 
Fourth District Lawsuit, provided as Attachment A to this brief. 
This Court may take judicial notice of the docket in the Fourth District Lawsuit. 
See, e.g., Billings v. Toscano, 2010 UT App 389 (unpublished), 2010 WL 5550456 
a t* ln .5 . 
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The Initial and Amended Notices of Determination. On October 12, 
2005, the Liquidator issued a Notice of Determination (Initial NOD), which denied 
Mellor's claim based on the Liquidator's belief that the claim was being 
administered by the Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association 
(ULHIGA). R.4610. Mellor filed a timely objection to the Initial NOD. R. 3023-
3025. On December 19,2005, the Liquidator issued an Amended Notice of 
Determination (Amended NOD), which denied Mellor's claim on the merits. 
R. 3043. The Liquidator concluded that Hay den "was not eligible for coverage 
under a Wasatch Crest Insurance Company policy due to his being eligible for 
Medicaid as of August 1, 2001 [,]" and due to the Wasatch Crest coverage having 
"terminated on July 31, 2001." Id. Because both the Wasatch Crest termination 
date and the Medicaid start date preceded August 4, 2001, the date of Hay den's 
accident, the Liquidator concluded that the Liquidation Estate could not be liable 
for Wasatch Crest's failure to pay Hay den's medical benefits. 
On February 14,2006, Mellor objected to the Amended NOD. R. 3128-
3351. The denial of coverage in the Amended NOD was submitted to a court-
appointed referee who agreed with the Liquidator on August 2, 2006. R. 3957-
3962. On August 18,2006, Mellor objected to the Referee's Findings of Fact and 
Recommendation. R. 4497-4610. On August 6, 2007, the district court approved 
the Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendation. R. 4939-4942. 
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The first appeal Mellor appealed the district court's decision to this Court. 
R. 4963-4964. In a decision filed January 27, 2009, the Court concluded that "the 
terms of the Wasatch Crest plan did not operate to terminate Hay den's coverage as 
a matter of law when Hay den became eligible for Medicaid coverage." Mellor v. 
Wasatch CrestMut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, \ 20, 201 P.3d 1004 {Mellor I). See also 
id. at ffif 11-21. However, the Court did not order payment of the claim, nor did it 
address either the priority (class) or amount of the claim - issues that neither the 
Liquidator nor the district court had reached (in light of their determinations of 
non-coverage). Also holding that Mellor has standing to bring a claim in the 
liquidation proceeding on behalf of her minor son, the Court ultimately permitted 
Mellor to "pursue an action for recovery of benefits owing to Hay den under the 
plan." Id. a t ! 2 1 . 
Mellor's summary judgment motion. This appeal concerns events that 
occurred after the first appeal. In Mellor I, by allowing Mellor to "pursue . . . 
benefits," the Court implicitly ordered the Liquidator to reconsider Mellor's claim. 
Under the Liquidation Act, the statutory proof of claim process is the exclusive 
means to prosecute a claim against the Liquidation Estate. Consequently, only the 
Liquidator could determine in the first instance whether Mellor's claim would be 
allowed, and if so, how the claim should be classified. However, in January 2010, 
before the Liquidator had issued a new determination, Mellor filed papers in the 
7 
liquidation proceeding styled as a "motion for summary judgment." Mellor sought 
an order requiring the Liquidation Estate to reimburse Medicaid for expenses 
Medicaid had paid from August 1, 2001 through July 31,2003. R. 5143-5325. 
The Liquidator moved to dismiss the "summary judgment motion" as an 
improper filing in a liquidation proceeding. The Liquidator's filings explained that 
under the Liquidation Act, there is no "complaint," "answer," or provision for 
summary judgment motions to be filed in the district court. Rather, the statutory 
claim process is the exclusive avenue for prosecution of claims against a 
liquidation estate under the Liquidation Act. R. 5565-5567, 5642-5645. 
Alternatively, the Liquidator moved to stay the summary judgment motion until he 
could issue an amended determination of the claim. R. 5564-5565, 5644-45. In 
the further alternative, the Liquidator argued against summary judgment on the 
merits for two reasons. First, because Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's bills, 
Medicaid is the real party in interest. As a non-policyholder, Medicaid could not 
assert a claim under the Wasatch Crest policy. Second, even assuming that Mellor 
had the claim, it could not be a Class Three claim as her summary judgment 
motion assumed, because Medicaid had fully indemnified Mellor for all her losses 
by paying for all of Hay den's medical care. At best, the Liquidator contended, 
Mellor might have a Class Six claim. R. 5576-5580, 5642-5650. 
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The Second Amended Notice of Determination. On June 29,2010, while 
Mellor's summary judgment motion was pending, the Liquidator issued his Second 
Amended Notice of Determination (Second Amended NOD). R. 5653. The 
Liquidator again denied Mellor's claim on the merits, concluding that she had 
suffered no unreimbursed loss under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) 
(2000, repealed 2007) (defining Class Three claims), because she had been fully 
indemnified by a third party, Medicaid. 
The district court's order. On November 1, 2010, the district court issued 
the order from which Mellor purports to currently appeal. R. 5702-5708. In dicta, 
the court addressed the merits of the parties' respective arguments, concluding that 
Mellor is a Class Six, not Class Three, claimant because Medicaid paid for 
Hayden's medical expenses. R. 5707-5708. Ultimately, the court denied Mellor's 
summary judgment motion and reaffirmed the stay entered in the Liquidation 
Order. R. 5708. This appeal followed. R. 5714-5715. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In addition to the procedural events outlined above, the following facts are 
pertinent to determination of this appeal. 
On August 4,2001, when Hayden's accident occurred, he was insured under 
a Wasatch Crest policy provided to Hayden's father through his employment, 
which Hayden's father elected to continue after his termination from employment, 
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under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. 
R. 5049, % 2. Wasatch Crest accepted premium payments on that policy through 
November 7, 2001. Mellor I, 2009 UT 5, \ 2. 
Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den two weeks after the 
accident. Id, f 3. When Medicaid approved the application in September 2001, it 
backdated Hay den's effective coverage date to August 1, 2001, to ensure Medicaid 
coverage for Hay den's past and future medical expenses arising from the accident. 
Id. 
Wasatch Crest continued to pay for Hay den's medical expenses until 
November 2001, when it asserted that its coverage ended once the Medicaid 
coverage began on August 1, 2001. Id, f 4. Wasatch Crest asked Hay den's 
providers to return amounts paid to them by Wasatch Crest and to instead obtain 
Medicaid's payment for those services. Id. Most of the providers complied with 
that request. Id. 
The Utah State Office of Recovery Services (ORS) is the state agency 
charged with the responsibility to administer Utah's Medicaid program. On 
October 3, 2002, ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Mellor. R. 4644-
4647. The Collection Agreement authorized Mellor to include in her civil case 
against Wasatch Crest - the not-yet-filed Fourth District Lawsuit - a claim by ORS 
for reimbursement of Medicaid amounts paid to Hay den. R. 4644. 
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On September 7, 2006, ORS filed a Notice of Representation of Medicaid 
Claim (Notice of Representation) in the W O O L liquidation proceeding. R. 4641-
4647. The Notice of Representation asserted that the Collection Agreement 
allowed ORS's claim for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits to be included in 
Mellor's claim against the Liquidation Estate. R. 4641. The Liquidator's 
September 13,2006 Response to the Notice of Representation expressly advised 
Mellor, Medicaid, and the ORS that "the ORS has not filed a claim in the 
liquidation estate as is required of any claimant or third party who seeks payment 
from the insolvent estate, and does not have a direct claim against the estate." 
R. 4661; see also R. 4662-4663. 
Neither ORS nor Medicaid ever filed a claim on its own behalf in the 
liquidation proceeding. 
For the Court's prior summary of most of these facts in Mellor i, see 2009 
UT5,1fl[2-4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The common thread in this case is Mellor's disregard for the controlling 
Utah statutes, rules, and case law: 
1. Under clear court rules and well-established case law, this Court lacks 
appellate jurisdiction over the district court's non-final Memorandum Decision and 
Order. An order denying a motion for summary judgment and confirming the 
11 
existence of a stay is not a final judgment. Mellor agrees that there is no legal 
authority for filing this appeal on an interlocutory basis. The Court should reject 
her argument, unsupported by law, that she may leap-frog the procedures mandated 
under the Liquidation Act, because waiting to appeal until she has a final judgment 
"would simply waste time and resources." 
2. Under the unambiguous language of the Liquidation Act, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31 A-27-332(l) (2002, repealed 2007), Mellor was required to object to the 
Liquidator's denial of her claim within sixty days of the Second Amended NOD. 
She failed to do so. As a consequence, (a) the Second Amended NOD became 
final on August 29, 2010, the sixty-first day after the Liquidator's determination; 
(b) the district court and this Court lack authority to review that determination on 
its merits; and (c) Mellor is permanently foreclosed from attacking that 
determination. This Court should therefore reject all of Mellor's arguments 
challenging the Second Amended NOD. 
3. Under another unambiguous provision of the Liquidation Act, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) (2000, repealed 2007), Mellor's claim is 
excluded from Class Three because Medicaid has indemnified her in full for her 
loss. Mellor's attempts to evade the statute's plain language lack merit. Mellor's 
claim is not a claim under a Wasatch Crest policy because she had no coverage as 
of the date the liquidation took effect and she had no filed-but-unresolved claims 
12 
for benefits as of that date. Mellor's coverage had ended and Wasatch Crest had 
rejected her claims almost two years earlier; therefore, her claim against the 
Liquidation Estate arose exclusively out of her inchoate claims in the Fourth 
District Lawsuit, which are non-policyholder creditor claims and fall outside the 
scope of Class Three. Nor is Mellor prosecuting a claim of a governmental entity 
under a Wasatch Crest policy - neither ORS nor Medicaid filed a proof of claim 
against the Liquidation Estate. Finally, the indemnification exclusion from Class 
Three is unambiguous and plainly applies here because Medicaid paid all of 
Hay den's medical expenses. The Liquidation Act expressly prohibits Mellor's 
equitable arguments against application of the indemnification exclusion in this 
case, and the equities do not favor Mellor. It is fair, and consistent with the 
purposes underlying the Liquidation Act, to exclude from Class Three the claim of 
a fully-indemnified former policyholder, so that more assets of the Liquidation 
Estate are available to compensate policyholders and competing creditor claimants 
as of the liquidation date. 
In truth, no inequities flow from the Second Amended NOD, denying 
Mellor's claim. Mellor is not out-of-pocket one cent — she owes nothing to 
Hay den's medical providers. Hay den's medical providers have all been paid. 
Medicaid chose not to protect its interest in reimbursement by filing a claim 
against the Liquidation Estate. The true real party in interest appears to be 
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Mellor's attorneys, whose contingent attorneys' fees will be paid based on the 
amount Mellor recovers on her claim, and who seek to circumvent the statutory 
distribution schedule. On the other side of the equation, the Liquidator has a 
fiduciary duty to determine and pay competing claims in accordance with the 
Liquidation Act. In this case, the claim was denied for failure to satisfy the Act's 
substantive and procedural requirements. On these facts, even if the purported 
"equities" were relevant - they are not - the Liquidator reached the fair and correct 
determination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ERROR. 
Mellor has not complied with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5), 
which requires an appellant's brief to state for each issue "the standard of appellate 
review with supporting authority," and either "citation to the record showing that 
the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Based on Mellor's failure to 
meet these requirements, this Court would be justified in "declining] to address 
any of [her] arguments." MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998). See 
also UTAH R. APP. P. 24(k) ("Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or strickenf.]"); Beehive Tel Co, v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 
2004 UT 18, ffif 12-16, 89 P.3d 131 ("Compliance [with the Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure concerning briefing] is mandatory and failure to conform to these 
requirements may carry serious consequences."). 
This Court's determination of its own jurisdiction, including whether a 
district court decision is final, is a question of law. Anderson v. Wilshire 
Investments, Z.L.C, 2005 UT 59, % 7, 123 P.3d 393. '"[M]atters of statutory 
construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness.'" Hill v. Estate 
of Alfred, 2009 UT 28, f 36, 216 P.3d 929 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
II. THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ORDER ON 
APPEAL IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
On January 21, 2011, the Liquidation Estate filed its Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. On March 31, 2011, after briefing, this 
Court entered its Order deferring the jurisdictional dispute until plenary 
presentation on the merits. The Liquidation Estate incorporates in this brief all 
arguments made in its January 21, 2011 Memorandum of Points atnd Authorities in 
support of dismissal. 
A, Under Bedrock Law, the November 1,2010 Order Is Not a Final 
Judgment. 
With the exception of certain interlocutory appeals (which Mellor does not 
purport to pursue here), this Court's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final 
orders and judgments. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 9, 5 P.3d 649. The 
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Court has "strictly adhered to [the final judgment] rule because limiting appeals to 
final judgments preserves scarce judicial resources . . . [and] also maintains 'the 
proper relationship between this Court and the trial courts.55' Powell v. Cannon, 
2008 UT 19, f 12, 179 P.3d 799 (citing, inter alia, Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, 
f 11,37 P.3d 1070; Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, \ 11). 
The district court's November 1, 2010 Order from which Mellor appeals is 
not final for two independent reasons. First, the order confirms a stay, which is 
not a final judgment. The district court's separate ruling related to the priority of 
Mellor5 s claim is dictum because it was not essential to the dispositive ruling that 
Mellor5 s claim is stayed. Second, even if the order could possibly be read as 
denying Mellor5 s summary judgment motion on its merits, an order denying 
summary judgment is not a final judgment. 
An order confirming a stay "neither end[s] the controversy between the 
litigants nor dispose[s] of the subject matter of the litigation.55 Powell, 2008 
UT 19, f 18 (dismissing appeal from an order compelling arbitration and staying 
litigation, based on lack of appellate jurisdiction); Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 
956 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the November 1, 2010 order did not 
end the controversy between Mellor and the Liquidator. Nor did it decide Mellor5 s 
claim on the merits. The district court held only that Mellor5s claim against the 
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Liquidation Estate must be pursued in accordance with the Liquidation Act. 
R. 5708. Thus, the order was not a final judgment. 
An order denying summary judgment is "strictly a pretrial order/' 
Switzerland Cheese Ass % Inc. v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966), 
not a final order. See also Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359, 
1360 (Utah 1977) (dismissing appeal from denial of summary judgment "because 
it is not a final order"). The November 1,2010 order denied Mellor's 
(procedurally improper) summary judgment motion because the Liquidation Order 
and Act precluded consideration of her claim except as part of the liquidation 
proceeding, R. 5708, i.e., after Mellor filed a timely objection to the Liquidator's 
Second Amended NOD. As an order that merely denied summary judgment, it is 
not a final and appealable judgment. 
Although the district court discussed some of the issues raised in Mellor's 
summary judgment motion, those comments were dicta because they were "not 
essential to the resolution of the issue in the case." Consolidation Coal Co. v. 
Emery Cty., 702 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1985). This Court does not have jurisdiction 
to review dicta. Salt Lake Cty. Comm 'n v. Salt Lake Cty. Atty., 1999 UT 73, f 25 
n.9, 985 P.2d 899 ("Because the trial court's hypothetical discussion is dicta and of 
no precedential value, we have no occasion to pass on its legal correctness."). 
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B. Mellor's Finality Arguments Lack Merit. 
The Liquidator presented the above-cited authority and more in his January 
21, 2011 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of dismissal, which he 
incorporates into this brief. In response, Mellor did not challenge any of the 
finality principles discussed above, nor did she offer any legal authority to support 
her premature appeal. Instead, Mellor argued that the November 1,2010 order is a 
final judgment because the district court's dicta resolves the ultimate issue in this 
case, namely, the correct classification of Mellor's claim, and "[t]here is simply 
nothing left for the district court to decide." See Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, at 5 (March 25,2011) 
(Mellor's Points and Authorities). 
The November 1, 2010 order made clear that the district court was not 
finally determining Mellor's claim against the Liquidation Estate. The court noted 
the issuance of the Second Amended NOD and Mellor's "option of challenging the 
latest Notice of Determination" within the liquidation proceeding.4 R. 5706. And 
the court made clear that it was not issuing a decision on the merits of Mellor's 
claim but, instead, merely "grant[ed] WCICIL's Motion to Stay because when the 
Court declared Wasatch Crest insolvent, it stayed further proceedings in the 
4
 In fact, though not mentioned in the order, by that time Mellor had failed to 
timely object to the Second Amended NOD. See infra at 21-26. 
18 
underlying lawsuit." R. 5708. Accordingly, contrary to Mellor's characterization 
of the November 1, 2010 order, it did not fully resolve Mellor's claim. 
Mellor offered a second justification for her premature appeal: that she grew 
tired of waiting for issuance of the Second Amended NOD after Mellor 7, and her 
impatience somehow imbued this Court with jurisdiction. See Mellor's Points and 
Authorities at 3 (asserting that Mellor sought summary judgment because "[a]t no 
time[after Mellor 7] did the Liquidator put in place a time frame or process to 
promptly and fairly resolve Mellor's claim"). But that response is a non-sequitur 
because it attempts to justify only Mellor's procedurally improper summary 
judgment motion, not her premature appeal. 
Equally important, Mellor errs in assuming that the Liquidator was dragging 
his feet on her claim after remand. To the contrary, he was working to resolve 
important issues - classification and amount of Mellor's claim - that were not 
addressed in the Amended NOD. Significantly, he learned new information once 
the claim was remanded - that is, Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's medical 
expenses. R. 5146, f^ 17, 5577. Upon remand, the Liquidator devoted time and 
energy to confirming the extent of Medicaid's indemnification and to settlement 
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discussions with Mellor's counsel. See, e.g., Exs. A-C to Affidavit of Brian S, 
King (March 25, 2011) (King Aff.), attached to Mellor's Points and Authorities.5 
Even if Mellor's frustration with the speed of redetermination after remand 
were legitimate - which it is not - there is no "impatience" exception to the final 
judgment doctrine. Mellor has posited that the Liquidator was "unreasonable" in 
asserting that Mellor needed to follow the Liquidation Act's procedures. Mellor's 
Points and Authorities at 8. She argues that the Liquidator's supposedly 
unreasonable conduct "should excuse any procedural irregularities" in her 
premature appeal. Id. But that is not the law. 
Mellor seems to believe that she may simply do whatever she thinks is most 
efficient in the circumstances, without regard to the procedures mandated in the 
Liquidation Act or the law that generally limits this Court's jurisdiction to review 
of final judgments. This Court should correct her misimpression by dismissing this 
premature appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
5
 In arguing for appellate jurisdiction, Mellor and her counsel have confused the 
separate identities of the Liquidation Estate and the ULHIGA. See King Aff. at 
f^lf 2-10. ULHIGA is an association authorized by statute to protect persons against 
failure in the performance of contractual obligation under a life, accident or health 
insurance policy. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-28-102 (2001). With respect to the 
Liquidation Estate, ULHIGA is only a creditor. Id, § 31A-28-114(3)(a). It is not 
authorized to act on behalf of WCICIL or its Liquidator. Mellor's counsel also 
mistakenly believes that WCICIL and/or the Liquidator are governed by a "board". 
King Aff. at fflf 7-8. The Liquidator is a court-appointed officer of the district court 
and there is no governing board. 
20 
i n . MELLOR MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE LIQUIDATOR'S DENIAL OF HER 
CLAIM BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE THE REQUIRED OBJECTION TO THE 
SECOND AMENDED NOD. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-332Q) (2002, repealed 2007) provides in full: 
(l)(a) When a claim is disallowed in whole or in part by 
the liquidator, written notice of the determination and of 
the right to object shall be given promptly to the claimant 
or the claimant's attorney of record, if any, by first-class 
mail at the addresses shown in the proof of claim. 
(b)(i) Within 60 days from the mailing of the notice 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the claimant may file 
objections with the court. 
(ii) If objections are not filed within the period provided 
in Subsection (l)(b)(i), the claimant may not further 
object to the determination. 
(Emphasis added.) The statute explicitly requires a claimant to object to a 
liquidator's disallowance of a claim, by filing an objection with the district court 
within 60 days from the date the liquidator mailed the notice of determination. 
Subsection l(b)(ii) unambiguously states that a claimant's failure to file an 
objection with the district court within that 60-day period precludes the claimant 
from "further object[ing] to the determination." These provisions, read together, 
are mandatory: a failure to timely object precludes the claimant from challenging 
the determination.6 
6
 The Liquidation Act does not permit the district court to extend the 60-day 
deadline for filing objections. Compare In re General Determination of Rights to 
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In this case, the Liquidator served his Second Amended NOD, denying 
Mellor's claim, on June 29, 2010. R. 5653. The Second Amended NOD expressly 
advised Mellor of the objection requirement, the sixty-day deadline for filing her 
objection, and the consequences of a failure to do so: 
If you disagree with the Liquidator's determination of 
your claim either in full or in part you have the right to 
object to the determination of your claim. To object to 
the determination you must file a written objection 
carrying the heading, In Re Wasatch Crest Insurance 
Company in Liquidation, Judge Toomey, Civil Case No. 
030915527, Third Judicial District Court, 450 South 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, within sixty days 
from the date of this notice. You must also send a copy 
of the objection to the Liquidator at the address on this 
letterhead. If you fail to file a written objection with the 
Court and with the Liquidator, within the specified time, 
you will have waived your right to object and the 
Liquidator's determination will stand and you will have 
no further right of appeal. 
Id. (bolded text in original; italics added). 
the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ffif 33-39, 110 P.3d 666 (construing UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 73-4-10 (1989) as permitting a retroactive extension of time for filing 
objections to the state engineer's proposed determination of water rights in a 
general adjudication, but only because that statute expressly permits the district 
court to extend the deadline for objections). 
Although the claimant's and her attorney's actual knowledge has no bearing on 
the statutory requirement of a timely objection, it is worth noting that Mellor and 
her counsel undeniably did understand the requirement to file a timely objection 
under the Liquidation Act. Mellor followed that procedure in 2006, after the 
earlier determination of her claim. R. 4497-4610. 
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Accordingly, under the Liquidation Act, Mellor was required to file an 
objection in the district court before August 28, 2010. She did not comply with the 
statute. To this day, Mellor has not filed an objection to the Second Amended 
NOD. The result of that failure, under the statute and as expressly confirmed in 
Second Amended NOD, is that "the Liquidator's determination. .. stand[s]" and 
Mellor "ha[s] no further right of appeal." R. 5653. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
27-332(l)(b)(2) (2002, repealed 2007). In other words, the Second Amended 
NOD is a final decision, which Mellor may not challenge. 
The district court's October 29, 2010 order does not address the 
consequences of Mellor's failure to object to the Second Amended NOD. Instead, 
it notes in passing that Mellor had not had an opportunity to object to that 
determination. R. 5706. That statement is incorrect. Mellor had the entire 60 days 
provided by statute to file an objection to the Second Amended NOD, but she 
failed to do so. 
Mellor's statement that the Second Amended NOD "was never formally 
served on Mellor or her counsel," OB at 13, f 46, is also inaccurate. The 
Liquidation Estate attached the Second Amended NOD to its reply brief supporting 
dismissal of Mellor's summary judgment motion, which was served by first class 
mail on Mellor's attorney of record, and thus on Mellor herself, as required by the 
statute. R. 5651. 
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Appellate courts are not limited to the district court's bases for decision. 
Rather, this Court may rule "based on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record.55 Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, \ 31, 171 P.3d 442 (quoting 
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65,1f 19, 147 p-3d 448, and Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 
58, % 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, if the Court 
exercises jurisdiction over this appeal, it should hold that Mellor may not pursue 
her current attacks on the Second Amended NOD because she did not file a timely 
objection with the district court. Statutory requirements for judicial review must 
be followed. Litigants may not use collateral procedures to evade statutory 
prerequisites to district and appellate court jurisdiction. 
For example, in Commercial Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1982), a circuit court denied the plaintiff banks5 request for contractual interest 
rates on certain judgments. Instead of filing an appeal from that inferior court 
decision to the district court, as required by Utah statutes and the Utah 
Constitution, plaintiffs petitioned for mandamus in the district court. The district 
court reached the issue on the merits and ruled against the banks. This Court 
affirmed, but on the distinct basis that "mandamus is not available as a substitute 
for an appeal[,]55 and, therefore, "plaintiffs did not have the option of substituting 
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus55 for the remedy of an appeal. Id. at 680 
(footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 
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1978) (a criminal defendant's failure to appeal his conviction to the district court 
presented an "insuperable obstacle" to his later habeas corpus petition: "When he 
failed to [appeal from the judgment and sentence], they should be considered to be 
at rest and not subject to what would be in effect a belated appeal by the use of 
habeas corpus proceeding.") (emphasis added and footnote omitted)8; Lucero v. 
Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, fflf 10-12, 89 P.3d 175 (a criminal defendant who 
"chose not to appeal his plea or conviction to the district court for a trial de novo," 
and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, "[voluntarily eschew[ed] the 
opportunity" to constitutionally challenge his conviction, and the district court 
lacked jurisdiction and should have summarily dismissed the petition), aff'd, 2005 
UT79, 125P.3d917. 
Like the appellants in the foregoing cases, Mellor "voluntarily eschewed" 
the remedy provided in the Liquidation Act. She chose not to file an objection to 
the Second Amended NOD within the statutory time limit of sixty days. As in the 
cited cases, once the sixty days passed, the Liquidator's determination became 
final and "should be considered to be at rest." Mellor may not bypass the 
In Webster, the Court nevertheless reviewed the judgment becaiuse the petitioner 
challenged his conviction as violating "basic constitutional rights" and the writ of 
habeas corpus "may be used in certain exigent circumstances/5 including where 
"there has been such unfairness or failure to accord due process of law that it 
would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction.'5 587 P.2d at 
530. No comparable circumstances exist here. 
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Liquidation Act's mandatory procedures by challenging the Second Amended 
NOD in the context of this appeal from the district court's denial of her 
procedurally improper summary judgment motion. This Court should rule that the 
Second Amended NOD is a final decision that Mellor may not challenge. 
IV. MELLOR'S CLAIM IS NOT A CLASS THREE CLAIM. 
The overriding purpose of the Liquidation Act is to mitigate losses to 
policyholders, creditors, and the public when an insurer is impaired or insolvent. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31 A-27-307(l), -307(3) (1999, repealed 2007). The Act 
allocates the limited assets of an insolvent insurer among various "classes" of 
claimants by establishing a priority of distribution. Id, § 31A-27-335 (2000, 
repealed 2007). To effectuate the statutory purpose of avoiding or, at least, 
mitigating creditors' losses, a[e]very claim in each class of claims" must be paid in 
full "before the members of the next class receive any payment." Id. § 31A-27-
335(l)(a). Mellor's appeal tries to circumvent this rule, in order to leap-frog the 
statutory classification schedule and obtain Class Three payment on what is, at 
best, a Class Six claim. 
The Liquidation Act assigns the highest priority to Class One and Class Two 
claims, for, respectively, administrative expenses approved by the liquidator and 
administrative expenses of guaranty associations. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(a)-(b). 
The next priority is assigned to policyholders, as Class Three claimants. Class 
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Four is reserved for "claims of the federal government not included in Class 3," 
i.e., taxes, assessments, and other federal claims that are not for losses under 
policies. Id., § 31A-27-335(2)(d). Class Five is limited to certain debts due 
employees for services performed. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(e). Claims of "any 
person, including claims of state or local governments," which do not fit into 
another class, fall into Class Six. Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(f)(i)(A).9 
Class Three claims are defined as "all claims under policies for losses 
incurred," id, § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(l) (emphasis added), including the following: 
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local government; 
(B) third party claims; 
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and 
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other than those 
included in class two, including claims for payment of 
covered claims or covered obligations of the insurer. 
Id, § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(D). However, the same section of the Liquidation 
Act expressly excludes from Class Three any claim for loss for which the claimant 
has been indemnified: "That portion of any loss for which indemnification is 
provided by other benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant 
are [sic] not included in this class[.]" Id., § 31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii). 
9
 Classes Seven and Eight are not relevant to Mellor's claim. 
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The policy underlying Section 31A-27-335(2)(c), which defines Class Three 
claims, is to make sure that unresolved claims for benefits, on file with the 
insolvent insurer at the time of liquidation, receive the highest priority in the 
distribution scheme, exclusive of administrative expenses. Those current 
policyholders, who have paid premiums and have an abiding expectation of 
coverage, are given preference in payment over other creditors. However, if a 
third party has paid the policyholder's loss claim, the insured is no longer exposed 
to losses and the statutory policy of protecting policyholders before other creditors 
is fulfilled - hence, the exclusion of "[tjhat portion of any loss for which 
indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages recovered or 
recoverable by the claimant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-33 5(2)(c)(iii) (2000, 
repealed 2007). That exclusion furthers the Liquidation Act's basic policy of 
protecting policyholders and creditors from loss, by preserving funds for the 
Liquidator to distribute to other claimants - with no adverse effect on the 
indemnified claimant. The policyholder's indemnitor is entitled to make a Class 
Six claim against the liquidation estate, along with other general creditors. 
In this case, following Mellor /, the Liquidator determined that the exclusion 
for indemnified losses applies to Mellor's claim because Medicaid had paid all her 
medical expenses: "The basis for the Denial is included in the attached Reply 
Memorandum, the essence of which is that the Claimant has been indemnified by a 
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third party and thus has suffered no unreimbursed loss ((see 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(iii))." R. 5653. See also R. 5649 (Reply Memorandum: "Because 
Medicaid paid Mellor's medical bills, that loss is expressly excluded from Class 
Three."). In dicta, the district court agreed with that reasoning. R. 5707-5708. 
Mellor makes three arguments against the Liquidator's Second Amended 
NOD. Initially, she obliquely asserts that her claim is filed under her terminated 
Wasatch Crest policy. She then contends that her claim is a "claim[ ] of the 
federal, state, or local government" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(i)(A) (2000, repealed 2007). Finally, though she cannot contest the fact 
of indemnification, she argues that Class Three's exclusion of claims for 
indemnified losses does not apply here for various equitable reasons. 
If the Court exercises jurisdiction and also does not rule against Mellor 
based on her failure to have filed an objection to the Second Amended NOD, the 
Court should reject all of Mellor's arguments on the merits of the classification of 
her claim. First, the Liquidation Act clearly states that Class Three is for "claims 
under policies for losses incurred," but Mellor does not have a claim under a 
Wasatch Crest policy because no policy was in force as of July 31,2003, when the 
liquidation took effect. Second, Mellor's claim is not a governmental claim since 
only she, and not the federal Medicaid program or the Utah ORS, filed a claim and 
alleges a loss incurred under a Wasatch Crest policy. Third, even if Mellor is 
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was "terminated as of August 1 , 2001 , a fact that Mellor admits. R. 5146. f 12. 
Consistent with "that termination, Wasatch Crest returned Mellor5s premium 
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Liquidation Order was entered and the Liquidator was appointed, Mellor was not 
insured under her prior, but terminated, Wasatch Crest policy, and she had no legal 
right to file a claim under that policy. 
Mellor appears to assume that the appointment of the Liquidator somehow 
revived or reinstated her terminated policy, such that she could assert a claim under 
that policy years after its termination. She is mistaken. Under the Liquidation 
Order, "4[a]ll rights and liabilities of WC Insurance, and its creditors, 
policyholders,. . . and all other persons'5 were "fixed as of July 11, 2003 [the date 
the Liquidation Petition was filed]." R. 149, ^ [6. The Liquidator is required to 
assess the insurer's assets and claims as of the date the Liquidation Petition was 
filed, and not before that date. He is required to handle then-existing claims as of 
the date of the Liquidation Order, not from the perspective of what should or 
should not have been done by the company before the filing of the Liquidation 
Petition. His job is not to rectify pre-liquidation decisions by Wasatch Crest. 
This is not to say that Mellor could not pursue a claim against the 
Liquidation Estate. She could do so because in March 2003, about five months 
before entry of the Liquidation Order, she had filed civil claims against Wasatch 
Crest, seeking payment of benefits under the previously terminated Wasatch Crest 
policy. That lawsuit is the reason Mellor may now assert a claim against the 
Liquidation Estate. But that lawsuit is an inchoate claim based on pre-liquidation 
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of the claim Mellor is pursuing." Id. at 18 See also id. at 19 ("[ORS]. is 
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These statements in Mellor1 s opening brief are wrong. To this day, neither 
ORS nor Medicaid has filed a proof of claim, as required by the Liquidation Act, 
with respect to !: *-.•• \ iedicaid bene! its paid u> Mellor, See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 31A-27-328(l) (1999, repealed 2007) & 31A-27-329 (1985, repealed 2007). 
Only Mellor has asserted a claim. 
Mellor mistakenly relies on the October 3, 2002 Collection Agreement 
between herself and ORS as establishing that ORS has asserted a claim against the 
Liquidation Estate. See OB at 18. However, the Collection Agreement is just an 
assignment agreement, in which Mellor agreed to assign to ORS any amounts she 
might collect through her claim. 
Significantly, the Collection Agreement identified only Wasatch Crest, and 
not WCICIL, as the "Potential Liable Third Party(s)." R. 4644. Thus, it assigned 
only amounts that Mellor might recover in the Fourth District Lawsuit that Mellor 
would later file against Wasatch Crest, not in the proceeding against the 
Liquidation Estate. As this Court held in Mellor /, under the Collection 
Agreement, ORS is "an assignee of [Mellor's] rights of recovery," 2009 UT 5, \ 4, 
but not a claimant itself: 
The Collection Agreement does nothing more than place 
a lien in favor of ORS on any reimbursement for medical 
expenses that may be recovered from Wasatch Crest. 
Thus, beyond its function of routing any potential 
recovery, the Collection Agreement has no relevance to 
the case before us. 
Id., \ 10 (emphasis added). 
Even if the Court were to construe the Collection Agreement as extending 
beyond the Fourth District Lawsuit to Mellor's claim against the Liquidation 
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L'shile, Ilk1 ajjrtviticTil eonl'iims dial Mi lloi 's, < niinsrl "'is lepiesenling the reapiem 
rMellor].'" ' not ORv :. ^ ' -• ' - t [Mclloi | ; and n< I 
OR^. i - 4 in i
 v.-niphasis aUdwu,. JLAUI if the Collection Agreement is construed 
M ^ we permitted M ell or to include in Mellor's claim amounts allegedly owed to 
K >!<S. and to itdvc assigned any recovered amounts from. Mellor to ORS, it cannot 
pos -: \ e. .. :s ha\ ing authorized Melloi to assert a claim h** , ti<s o ihe 
"[ORS's] direct right of recovery against any proceeds psi vable by ;in pbl'f.!,:iled 
third party [,]" which they expressly "acknowledge^]." R. 4645, % 2. See also 
R. 4767 (Mellor's acknowledgment that "[her] counsel has not appeared for 
ORS.") • ) 
Mellor hues no hellci undei 'ORS's Nepleii. . .-.;,.. w. 
••^ntatioii nf Medicaid Claim, on VVIIIN li she 
starters, the Notice of Representation was filed over two ^ear^ alter th- '^ 
2004, deadline for filing proofs of claims in the liquidation proceeding, as 
establishes n- *v I lquidation Order F 1 ^ . 118, 4641-4647. Moreover, the 
10
 This distinction is significant. Section 3 I A-27~335(2 )u:)(l) includes claims by 
government agencies only to the extent they are chains, Haider policies,'" A 
"direct" ORS claim for amounts it paid would not he a policy c la im- it would be a 
Class Six creditor's claim for indemnification V..:i as discussed above, to the 
extent - policyholder's claim has been indemnified, it is ulso excluded from Class 
Th-v 
Notice does not purport to assert a claim on behalf of ORS. It merely "allow[s] the 
[unasserted] Medicaid claim to be included in [Mellor's] claim." R. 4641. 
Mellor confuses the issue further when she states that her claim "included 
losses incurred and claims paid by the federal and state government." OB at 15. 
Section 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A) defines Class Three claims as including "claims of 
the federal, state, or local government" - not "losses incurred and claims paid by 
the federal and state government." "Claims of5 a governmental entity, as used in 
the statute, refers to a claim made against the Liquidation Estate. "Claims paid by 
the federal and state government," as used in Mellor's brief, refers to payment of 
her claim for Medicaid coverage. She is mixing apples and oranges. 
Mellor's statement that ORS "gave clear notice to the Liquidator of 
Medicaid's interest in the Mellor claim and its right to be reimbursedf,]" OB at 15, 
is also irrelevant to the issue of classification. The Liquidator disallowed Mellor's 
claim based on Medicaid's indemnification of Hay den's medical expenses, not 
based on his knowledge or lack of knowledge that Mellor had agreed to assign the 
proceeds of her claim to ORS. 
This Court must apply an unambiguous statute as written. State v. Wallace, 
2006 UT 86, \ 9, 150 P.3d 540. Mellor does not suggest that Section 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(i)(A) is ambiguous, and it is not. Because Mellor's claim is not a claim 
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mulct tin iftctlun I's ii j'OYiMiimtiilLiI eulil \ il i,s nm i < lass 1 hrcc claim mnlri Ntvlmii 
31A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A). 
C. Because Medicaid Fully Indemnified Mellor's Loss, Section 31A-
27-335(2)(c)(ii) Excludes the Claim From Class Three. 
Even if I"1 > lei loi coi ild establish a claim i indei a W asatch Crest policy (she 
cannot), the I n|iiidaloi piopeih disallowed her chum bceuuse siic i*eeei\nl lull 
indemnification from Medicaid for Hay den's medical expenses \ M I <k >h , any 
such theoretical claim is subject to the exclusion for "[tjhat portion of any loss for 
which indemnification is provided K ^ther benefits or advantages recowied or 
recoveici^ie \:?: *<ae ciaiman i Ah I OD\ ANN. y i ^ -335(2)(cKiii) < 2000. 
repi M« 
The . . I :. 
been indemnified by a linn! part\ and thus has suffered iiu unreimbursed loss," 
R, 5653
 5 was undeniably correct as a matter of fact. It is undisputed that Medicaid 
paid Hayden's medical bills, in the total amount of $181 /"> 1.51. before i. ntr\ of 
the Liquidatioi I Order on J iil> 31, 2003 R 51 91 -51 92 See also OB ai <>. ^ | 16, 
]*» ihroiilifniiiir I n:( of Mallit aid pa\nienl .mil iiiioiiiiiil paid! Melloi \\dh lull\ 
indemnified by Medicaid and she owes nothing to aix> pro vider for the medical 
services covered by her claim. In fact, those providers were required to accept the 
Medicaid payments as payment in full for the services provided fo TTa\ eh :i , See 
42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2010). Thus, Medicaid has indemnified Mellor against loss 
due to medical expenses resulting from Hay den's accident. 
Unable to rebut the fact of indemnification, Mellor instead advances various 
equitable arguments why the Court should not apply the indemnification exclusion 
as written. Her arguments individually and collectively lack merit. 
1. The Statute Prohibits Mellor's Equitable Arguments. 
At the outset, the Liquidation Act precludes Mellor's equitable pleas: "A 
claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other creditor may not be permitted to 
circumvent the priority classes through the use of equitable remedies." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-27-335(l)(d) (2000, repealed 2007). 
The Court should reject Mellor's effort to avoid this statutory bar by 
characterizing her "claims against the Liquidator" as "claims on the Wasatch Crest 
insurance policy, a written contract, rather than equitable claims." OB at 16. 
Setting aside Mellor's mischaracterization of her claim as arising under the 
terminated Wasatch Crest policy, see supra at 30-32, her response does not change 
the fact that she is seeking to "circumvent the priority classes" through equitable 
arguments that the Liquidation Act prohibits.11 
11
 Section 31 A-27-335(l)(d) refers to "the use of equitable remedies," which 
includes the equitable arguments that Mellor advances here. The obvious intent of 
the statute is to preclude claimants from avoiding the statutory priority scheme 
through appeals to equity. The legislature's intent can be accomplished only if the 
37 
2. The Fact of Medicaid Payments Cannot Override 
Unambiguous Statutory Provisions, 
Mellor's primary equitable argument is thai die meemniiicaiion exclusion 
should not upj il' i\ hci t\ as in (his ease, Medicaid was the indemnifying third party 
Again,, Melloi dnou inol s u r e s t thai Section \ I A /"" ' 1 V5( ?)(^)(i)( A ) i'i ambi^uoir. 
]Mor could she. Ihe statute clearly and unequivocally states liiai. ";. . T 
losses "for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages 
re* i.'vered or recoverable bv die claimant aic not included in this class[.]" Its 
meaning I*. • • u a uuun.int againsi *u ujindaiion estate lias ocen inuennuiieo 
M'tuicL i 1 a. -a : : * .• . ..:.> i s excluded from 
< : r ^ f ' ' - >* r , . ^ • ; * i v e 
must apply the ""unambiguous statute as written. State v. Wallace, 2006 L1* bo,€ - * 
150P.3d540,12 
phrase "equiuu..^. ^i i icj ; . . . ... i^ao ie .mJt.d^ ;\>i.. equitable claims ano ^....u <* 
arguments. Sidle ex rel ( lark v Blue ( VYASW #/MC Shield of West Virginia, inc., 
195 \\\Va. 5r 466 S.H.2d 188 ( iu*>- i is instructive. There, a claimant asserted 
various reasons wh} the recei\er should accept hei untimely filed elainj Vi hough 
the claimant made onh equitable arguments, not c uittahlo claims thv. \\ *s? 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in\ oked., among other pioviston.s of ;he Model 
Liquidation Ad. Wi si VA CODK § 33-24-27. which h id-ntieal to UTAI; CO\W 
A N N § 3 1 A - r *3^!«d- 466 S.E. 2d at 392. 
Meilor niie _ ; - iei} *•-. a,c e cuu - p»aic> statements regarding Medicaid 
coverage in A/. -lo* /. .see 2009 UT 5, |^1i 17-20, but those statements should have 
no bearing in Ihis appeal, h, WAlo* L Hie t"ourt considered the purposes 
underl} ing iederal and state law in revolving an ambiguity in the pre-liquidation 
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Despite the clarity of the indemnification exclusion in Section 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(iii), Mellor argues that "this general language [in that section] is 
insufficient to override the explicit reference in U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(l)(A) 
to claims of the federal and state government for losses incurred being class three 
claims." OB at 15. What Mellor describes as the "general language" in Section 
31A-27-335(c)(iii) does exactly what Mellor says it is "insufficient" to do: it 
provides that claims that would otherwise be Class Three claims (because they are 
listed in Section 31 A-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(D)) are excluded from Class Three if a 
third party has indemnified the claimant for the underlying losses. And Section 
31A-27-335(c)(iii) draws no distinctions based on the source of the 
indemnification. So long as "indemnification is provided by other benefits or 
advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant" - whoever the indemnitor 
may be - the claim is excluded from Class Three. 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-5 and § 26-19-7 (2005) Are 
Inapplicable. 
As a related equitable basis for disregarding the indemnification exclusion in 
this case (despite its unambiguous applicability), Mellor contends: "U.C.A. §26-
Wasatch Crest insurance plan. Here, the controlling statute is not ambiguous. 
Therefore, it would be improper to decide the scope of the indemnification 
exclusion based on anything other than the language of Section 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(iii) itself. Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 31, 234 
P.3dll05. 
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has priority over ail other claims to the proceeds . . . ' except claims for attorney 
fees and costs as authorized under U.C.A. §26-19-7(2)(c)(ii)." OB at F ' r 
argument misstates the record and the law 
I\ lellor assumes that OR S has alien against amounts allegedly owed by the 
Liquidation I^lulo umW 1 h \^ 11C % »l >i« ANN f^o-l" M ' ^ ' H ,<l,lr,|» M"1 
Liquidation Estate takes no position on that issue., which this (Y>url need nol 
resolve, because that section does not purport to override the indemnification 
exclusion in Section 31 -\-27-335(2)(c)(i)(A). 
Scctiuu lb-l9-i>[ t K~ i)iti\m^ M* hji : 
i\ii\ uianu [ui ORSj unaci ^unseenon (i){&) L°r section 
26-19-5] or Section 26-19-4.5 to recover medical 
assistance provided to : recipient is a lien against any 
proceeds payable to oi m oehalf of the recipient by that 
third party. This lien has priority over all other claims to 
the proceeds, except loi attorney's fees and costs 
authorized undt*r Suhseetion 26™ 19-7(2)(cj(ii). 
The statute recognizes, under certain circumstances, an OR S lien on proceeds 
< - n filed by llic ivcipienl in ilir li<|imlatinn proeei'diiij.', Accordingly, ml r 
irrelevant to whether Mellor's claim falls under Class Three. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii) (2005) is also irrelevant. Mellor 
asserts that th:~ nrovision and unidentified "language of the United States Code" 
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require that, "as a condition of receipt of federal dollars, the Utah state Medicaid 
program must maintain a program to pursue reimbursement of funds paid out by 
Medicaid but for which third parties are later determined to be responsible." OB 
at 16. Once again, Mellor misunderstands what the Utah statute says in multiple 
ways. 
First, Section 26-19-7 imposes no duty on ORS; rather, it requires a 
claimant like Mellor to take a number of steps upon filing a claim against a third 
party. Second, that section draws a clear distinction between ORS's right to file a 
claim (which.ORS did not do here), and its alternative right to forego filing a claim 
and instead to enter into a collection agreement with the claimant, to ensure that 
funds recovered by the claimant are assigned to ORS (which ORS and Mellor did 
here, though only with respect to funds recovered from Wasatch Crest, not the 
Liquidation Estate). Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(a)(i) (2005) ("if the 
department has a claim or lien pursuant to Section 26-19-5...") (emphasis added), 
and UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(2)(b)-(c) (2005) (providing for a collection 
agreement). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-7(4)(a)-(c) (2005) (distinguishing 
between "the recipient's claim" and "the department's [or state's] claim"). 
In short, Section 26-19-5 and Section 26-19-7 do not support Mellor's 
equitable arguments. In fact, they do not even say what Mellor would have this 
Court believe they say, and they instead further explain why the indemnification 
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excli isioi i in Section 31 A 27 33 5(2)(c)(iii) applies in "this case and excludes 
Mellor's claim from Class 1 hree. 
4. Exclusion of Mellor from Class Three Does Not Result in an 
Impermissible Windfall. 
As a (null uimtiihk1 aii'iiiiinil Mrlloi contends tin! disallonatiic of hri 
c la im "a Hows Wasatch. Crest to receive a windfall due to its own bad act in 
refusing to pa> a valid claim." Oii ai 1 /. Yet again, Mellor ignores the fact that 
Wasatch Crest is nol a nam u* this case and has ceased *** exist as an operating 
entity a? a result ofdk- Liquidation Order. The u ^ A , yww \
 :O,M V-U L ... mis 
proceeding v ' :- ' :):out;i; wim. • :. - ... ^ - , iu^ 
a C tS I h ' S S N - \ • • * - s 5 . - * " . t in; . I ' l l M'-i 
[Wa s.'Jt -h r - • iv. i4i* * . 
In any e\ ent, the denial of Mellor's claim yielded no windfall whether to 
Wasatch Crest or the Liquidation Estate. Wasatch Crest was insolvent when 
liquidation was ordered It had insufficient assets to satisfy its liabilities ' Fhe 
amounts thai Hie Liquidiiloi i mm liulrcl should nol he paiul In Melloi brc.ime 
a i a i lable to pa;; other claimants. Unlike a prrs a te litigant the Liquidation Estate 
ancl j t s Liq^^ator have no personal interests in retaining assets or denying payment 
to lawful claimants. At the conclusion of the liquidation proceedings, all assets are 
distributed to the appropriate creditors of the Liquidatiuh L stale m accordance with 
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the priority scheme devised by the Utah legislature; there are no residual assets that 
accrue to the benefit of the Liquidation Estate or the Liquidator. 
Nor did pre-liquidation Wasatch Crest receive any windfall by terminating 
the policy once Medicaid coverage began, even though this Court concluded in 
Mellor /that the termination was in error. See OB at 17-18. Pre-liquidation 
Wasatch Crest returned all premiums that Mellor paid for Hayden's coverage after 
August 1,2001, when Medicaid coverage commenced and Wasatch Crest 
erroneously believed that coverage under its plan ended. R. 4500, 4602. 
Accordingly, there was no windfall because pre-liquidation Wasatch Crest 
received nothing, i.e., no premiums, in exchange for its alleged liability to 
Hayden's medical providers. And as a matter of equity, there was no harm to 
Mellor, Hay den, or Hayden's providers because Medicaid paid for all of Hayden's 
medical treatment. 
D. Mellor's Claim Is, at Best, a Class Six Claim. 
The Liquidator correctly determined that Mellor's claim does not qualify for 
assignment to Class Three. It also does not fall within Classes One, Two, Four, 
and Five. Accordingly, at best, the claim falls within Class Six, which includes 
claims of "any person, including claims of state or local governments, except those 
specifically classified elsewhere in this section[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-27-
335(2)(f)(i)(A). 
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The Second Amended T • "'- . >i icach the question of potential 
assignment to Class Six. R. 5653. Lor reasons discussed above, this Court should 
not reach that, issue either. First, the Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction. Second, even assuming jurisdiction. <nc i ,»u;*i -><- . .. 
liiilrdlu lilc ,i lunch, nhjcrlioii lo llml doh'rmiiuilinii II" llie1 'onrl neuillick'Ni 
addresses the merits of the Second Amended N OD, and affirms the Liquidator's 
rejection of Class Three classification but concludes that Mellor may pursue a 
Class Six claim, the Court should remand for the I liquidator to determine the 
amount Mellor may recover. 
i 
t* * *• datum I:(sta1e's M e m o r a n d u m of 
1J( : t ui Authorities in Support oflts Motion LKJ x>Xk>miss Appeal, Wasatch Crest 
Insurance Company in Liquidation respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to affirm the Liquidator's 
denial of Mellor s claim. 
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DATED this 20th day of July, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
John P. Harrington (#5242) 
Attorneys for Appellee Wasatch Crest 
Insurance Company in Liquidation 
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ATTACHMENT \ 
4TH DISTRICT CT - AF 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS ANN WILLIAMS MELLOR vs. WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CASE NUMBER 050102878 Contracts 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
CHRISTINE JOHNSON 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - CHRIS ANN WILLIAMS MELLOR 
Represented by: ROBERT J SCHUMACHER 
Defendant - WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE 
Defendant - WASATCH CREST INSURANCE COMPAN 
Defendant - AMERICAN GROUP ADMINISTRATORS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
09-23-05 Case filed 
09-23-05 Judge DEREK P PULLAN assigned. 
09-23-05 Note: Provo Case #030401281 
09-28-05 Filed: Notice (Defendent in liquidation action in 3rd District) 
10-07-05 Filed: Notice of Transfer for Randall Smart Return in Mail-Will 
send to New Address 
12-05-06 Order to Show Cause scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 08:30 AM 
in Courtrm 1, 3rd Floor with Judge PULLAN. 
12-05-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050102878 ID 9487780 
Order to Show Cause. 
Date: 2/1/2007 
Time: 08:30 AM Location: Courtrm 1, 3rd Floor 
DEREK P PULLAN 
The parties and/or counsel in this case are to appear before this 
Court and show cause why this case should not be dismissed. 
If you do not appear, the Court will enter an Order of Dismissal 
without further hearing. 
12-11-06 Filed: Returned Mail - Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance - Unable 
to Forward 
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No Parties Present 
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TAPE: 0711P CR1 COUNT: 8.51.50 
This matter was set for an Order to Show Cause on the Court's own 
motion. Parties have failed to appear. A pleading from the 
Plaintiff's counsel was filed stating the liquidation action of 
Wasatch Crest must be addressed in the Third District 
Court where the liquidation was filed. This matter is therefore 
dismissed without prejudice. 
02-05-07 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice 
Disposition Judge is DEREK P PULLAN 
03-31-07 Note: Archived Physical File CV07-09 DESTROY 8/07 
09-26-07 Note: CASE HAS MET RETENTION SCHEDULE- FILE DESTROYED 9/26/2007 
01-02-08 Judge DAVID MORTENSEN assigned. 
06-30-09 Judge CHRISTINE JOHNSON assigned. 
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